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The Archaeology of Knowledge and “Order of Discourse”

     The Archaeology of Knowledge (abbreviated in English as AK, French: L'Archéologie du Savoir, published in 1969) is Foucault’s methodology in analyzing discourse. Later he turns form archaeological analysis to genealogical accounts. His “Order of Discourse”(French: L’order du discours, or “Discourse on Language” in some English translations), inaugural lecture as Professor of the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France, 1970, indicates such methodological transition. “Archaeological analysis describes that discourse is constructed by the rules of formation; however, genealogical accounts examine the complex interrelatedness between discourse and the exercise of power”(Chen 16). Following The Archaeology of Knowledge, “Order of Discourse” anticipates practice in historical discourse in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality.

In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault states that traditionally the object of historical research has been the various sedimentary strata and linear successions. But “[f]rom the political mobility at the surface down to the slow movement of ‘material civilization’, ever more levels of analysis have been established: each has its own particular discontinuities and pattern [. . .]”(AK 3). He gives examples that if we descend from the surface of political mobility we can see that “[b]eneath the rapidly changing history of governments, wars, and famines, there emerge other, apparently unmoving histories: the history of sea routes, the history of corn or gold-mining,[etc.]” (AK 3). Thus according to Foucault’s archeological analysis, “attention [on historical discourse] has been turned [. . .] away from vast unities like ‘periods’ or ‘centuries’ to the phenomena of rapture, of discontinuity” (AK 4, bold type mine). The “total history” which is familiar to us will disappear, along with “homogeneous manifestations of a single mind or of a collective mentality” and “persistence of a particular genre, form, discipline, or theoretical activity.” Instead, “general history” which is unfamiliar to us will emerge (AK 9). This reminds me of Robert Redfield’s great tradition and little tradition. When applied to the study of Chinese culture, great tradition is often compared to the continual historical discourse in politics and literature. For instance, the genealogy of ancient emperors or poets is not unfamiliar to most Chinese people.

Foucault’s argument about the discontinuity of historical discourse; however, faces counterpart in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale. The Republic of Gilead gains political power from former government dramatically, and from Offred’s recollection of Pre-Gilead society we can see that continuality of Pre-Gileadean and Gileadean discourse is absent. Religious discourse is then appropriated by this imaginary hegemony to justify its regime as true successor of the former. In Foucault’s definition, the “elementary unit of discourse” is “statement” (AK 80). It is different from sentence or proposition. Firstly, a proposition (sentence) becomes different statements because the former can appear in different discursive contexts. Foucault’s mention of context reminds me of Bakhtin’s dialogism, and it also reminds me that both schools are related to structuralism. The biblical allusions in The Handmaid’s Tale, due to its context in times of Gilead regime and in places like Red Center, are no longer blessings by God but oppressions of female in the mask of protectors. The Gilead founder’s proposal of making real the biblical role “handmaid” is to me more shocking than Jonathan Swift’s “A Modest Proposal” of eating babies, and the “Eye” more fearful than “Big Brother” who is watching you. The “brave new world” Gilead creates is in essence a Distopia that Offred would prefer not to give birth so that no more children would suffer from Distopia and utter painfully “never let me grow.”

Secondly, a proposition (sentence) becomes statements because “the position of the subject [of statement] can be assigned [with power]” (AK 95, bold type mine). In The Handmaid’s Tale, the subjects of the distorted biblical statements are Commanders and Aunts. Commanders have long been assigned with power, like bishops or priests whom may be more familiar to us. Aunts are empowered with names which attempt, like religious discourse, to assert continuality with Pre-Gilead society—according to “Professor Pieixoto,” Aunts’ names like Elizabeth are to remind Handmaids of the good old days in which they still have cosmetics branded Elizabeth Arden. Thirdly, a statement works not in isolation but “in an enunciative network.” “There is no statement that does not presuppose others; there is no statement that is not surrounded by a field of coexistences, effects of series and succession, a distribution of functions and roles” (AK 99). To sum up, the statement with its empowered subject shares time and space with other statement in network, thus forming the discursive context by which they are defined (Chen 21).

Thus in the discursive context, the statement with its empowered subject will be validated and classified by authority as truth and knowledge. In other words, “knowledge is defined by the possibilities of use and appropriation offered by discourse” (AK 183, bold type mine). The authority does so because, like everyone, it has the “will to power.” Apart from power, desire also via “will to truth” functions as momentum in the operation of discourse. But “will to truth” is often transformed into “will to knowledge,” uttering “what was said,” because beneath the discourse, the three momentum “will to power,” “will to truth,” and “will to knowledge” interweaves with each other—transformation is needed because we all have “will to power” and fear to be excluded from the group of discourse.   

In “Order of Discourse,” Foucault proposes three rules that discourse follows: “rules of exclusion,” “internal rules of rarefaction,” and “rules of inclusion.” The last two have more to do with discipline and punish, thus I would just focus on the first rule. There’re three forms in rules of exclusion. First is “prohibition,” and among its three types, “taboo of speech” is explicitly uttered in The Handmaid’s Tale (“sterile” is forbidden in Gilead). In addition to the prohibition of spoken language, we can see that reading and writing is prohibited in Gilead. It is to avoid people from getting access to written language, which also means getting access to utter and claim for the right for speech. The result is fearful to distopic regime that it can no longer manipulate power on its people. Second is “division or rejection.” In Foucault it’s the division between reason and madness, while in The Handmaid’s Tale it’s between the obedient Handmaid and disobedient Unwoman (in traditional literature, I think it’s similar to the division between “Angle in the House” and “la femme fatale”). Third is “division between true and false knowledge.” The aforementioned “will to truth” will help make the division (Chen 22-23). In The Handmaid’s Tale, via the operation of power, any biblical allusions relating to reproduction become the true knowledge which is to be educated by Aunts in Red Center and preached by Commanders in sitting room before Ceremony.

Works Cited

Chen, Shih-ying. “Fluidity of Power in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale: A Foucauldian Perspective.” MA thesis National Chengchi University, 2002. Web. 4 December 2011.

Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of Knowledge. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. 1972. New York: Routledge, 1991. Print.